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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 It seems that with each passing day, a new form of technology is created.  Our society is 
transforming into one reliant on the technology we are constantly introduced to.  Computers, cell 
phones, IPods, and IPads encourage us to rely on electronic pathways to live our daily lives.  But 
while we utilize technology each day, and trust these gadgets to store our most important tasks, 
appointments, thoughts, and contacts, the law is struggling to keep up.   
Cell phones have been a major problem for courts in recent years; more particularly, how 
to apply the Fourth Amendment when a cell phone is searched by law enforcement officials 
incident to an arrest.  Some courts find that during arrests for routine traffic stops, it is reasonable 
to search one’s cell phone without consent or notice to the cell phone owner.  Other courts find 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment a necessary element to any search of a cell 
phone, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the search.   
Furthermore, companies such as Cellebrite market “mobile forensic” capabilities which 
complicate this Fourth Amendment question.  Cellebrite boasts “unparalleled access to phone 
memory” regardless of phone lock codes or deleted items.1  Cellebrite’s CEO Aviad Ofrat told a 
trade magazine that “mobile device forensics is the future.”2  He further stated that “with the 
wealth of data even a casual user has stored in his or her cell phone, smart-phone, or PDA, it is 
quickly becoming THE one piece of evidence that is interrogated immediately.”3  How far 
should these companies, through law enforcement officers, be allowed to take their intrus ions 
into one’s private life?  This question has sparked much debate between law enforcement and 
privacy advocates around the country. 
                                                                 
1
 CELLEBRITE, http://www.cellebrite.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
2
 Alexis Madrigal, What Does Your Phone Know About You?  More Than You Think , THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2011, 
10:33 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/04/what-does-your-phone-know-about-you-more-
than-you-think/237786/. 
3
 Id. 
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Have our privacy rights disappeared as we store all of our private communications and 
documents on our cell phones?  Does a routine traffic stop allow a law enforcement officer to 
search and extract data from a cell phone merely because they want to do so?  If someone is 
arrested, is that reason enough to have their cell phone’s history, call logs, applications, pictures, 
messages, e-mails, and videos, among dozens of other personal items, be searched and extracted?  
All of these privacy concerns have been examined by courts across the country, yet these courts 
have come to very dissimilar conclusions.   
This paper will analyze how courts have addressed warrantless cell phone searches, and 
then apply this case law to mobile forensic technology to analyze how courts might address the 
warrantless extraction of cell phone data.  Additionally, it will consider where the line should be 
drawn, if any, when it comes to searching and extracting the contents of a cell phone and further, 
the emerging issues regarding “cloud computing” and privacy rights.  
 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
  
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures.  It 
states that  
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.4   
 
The Supreme Court recognizes that this “security” against unreasonable searches and seizures 
upon the private lives of people is important and necessary and that “the framers of the Fourth 
Amendment required adherence to judicial processes wherever possible.”5  The Court has also 
                                                                 
4
 U.S. CONST . amend. IV.    
5
 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 185 (1974) (citing Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948)).  
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stated that “the presence of a search warrant serves a high function.”6  The primary role of the 
Fourth Amendment is to place a magistrate judge between the citizen and the police and “absent 
some grave emergency,” this system should not be disrupted.7  Therefore, whenever practicable, 
and if no exception to the warrant requirement applies, “the police must…obtain advance judicial 
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure” and “the scope of [a] search 
must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible.”8 
It is well established law that “the capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment depends…upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment 
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.”9  The Supreme Court has adopted 
the Katz test from Justice Harlan’s famous concurrence which explained that there are two parts 
to any inquiry into whether someone has a legitimate expectation of privacy: first, privacy must 
be looked at subjectively, meaning someone must have exhibited an actual expectation of 
privacy, and second, one’s expectation of privacy must be “one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”10 
A.  EXCEPTIONS TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
 
Exceptions to the warrant requirement have been named “few in number and carefully 
delineated,”11 giving law enforcement the heavy burden of demonstrating “an urgent need that 
                                                                 
6
 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948)). 
7
 United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1168 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455). 
8
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968) (A search undertaken during a “stop and frisk” was found reasonable 
because it was a protective search for weapons, thus, an acceptable warrantless search under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
9
 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). 
10
 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
11
 United States v. U.S. District Court (Plamondon), 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972). 
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might justify [a] warrantless search.”12  However, courts have recognized that the “overriding 
principle of the Fourth Amendment is one of reasonableness,” and thus, exceptions to the 
warrant requirement have been “carved out in a logical and flexible manner.”13 
First and foremost, if a suspect or arrestee voluntarily consents to a search, without any 
form of police coercion, a warrant is not required.14  Additionally, the warrant requirement is 
excused when exigent circumstances are present.  Exigent circumstances “excuse an officer from 
having to obtain a magistrate’s determination that probable cause exists; it does not permit a 
search in the absence of probable cause.”15  These circumstances require immediate action to be 
undertaken by law enforcement in order to “prevent flight, safeguard the police or public, or to 
protect against the loss of evidence.”16  In addition to probable cause to search, an officer “must 
have probable cause to believe that the persons or items to be searched or seized might be gone, 
or that some other danger would arise, before a warrant could be obtained.”17  The focus 
becomes whether “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so 
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”18 
Another exception is the “search incident to arrest.”  The Supreme Court has held that 
immediately upon arresting an individual, an officer may lawfully search that person without 
obtaining a warrant.19  Officers may also search the area within the arrestee's immediate 
control.20  These warrantless searches have traditionally been justified by the fact that it is 
                                                                 
12
 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984). 
13
 United States v. Martin, 806 F.2d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1986). 
14
 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (holding that a search pursuant to consent, properly 
conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity). 
15
 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INVESTIGATIVE: CASES AND 
COMMENTARY 361 (9th ed. 2010). 
16
 Id. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).   
19
 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
20
 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
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reasonable for law enforcement to immediately search for weapons, instruments of escape, and 
evidence of a crime upon an arrest.21  These have been called “protective searches” since they 
address the possibility that a weapon may be easily accessible to an arrestee that may put officers 
at risk, or evidence on or around an arrestee that could be concealed or destroyed.  The Court has 
reasoned that “a gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous 
to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested” and that, 
therefore, there is “ample justification…for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area within 
his immediate control.”22 
Searches that are incident to arrests and based on probable cause have also included pre-
incarceration “inventory searches” which have also been deemed admissible and do not require a 
warrant under the Fourth Amendment.  This is because the lawful arrest itself establishes 
authority to search, and therefore “a full search of the person is not only an exception to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that 
Amendment.”23  An inventory search must be regulated by “standardized criteria” or 
“established routine” so as not to “be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover 
incriminating evidence.”24  The search may include containers or articles in an arrestee’s 
possession at the time of arrest.25  A container is “any object capable of holding another 
object.”26  Containers include “glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located 
anywhere within [a] passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the 
                                                                 
21
 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03 (1974). 
22
 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
23
 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
24
 Florida v. Wells , 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). 
25
 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983). 
26
 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). 
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like” and may be searched whether they are open or closed.27  Such container searches have been 
permitted not because a suspect has no privacy interests in his personal effects, but because “[a] 
lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest” a suspect may have in 
such effects.28 
Another common exception is the “plain view doctrine.”  In some circumstances, law 
enforcement officers may seize evidence in plain view without having a warrant.29  Under 
Coolidge, the plain view doctrine applies when three requirements are met: “(1) the intrusion by 
the police must have a prior justification under the Fourth Amendment; (2) the discovery of the 
evidence must be ‘inadvertent’; and (3) it must be ‘immediately apparent’ to the police that the 
items are evidence or otherwise subject to seizure.”30  The Supreme Court, however, has clarified 
that “while inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate ‘plain view’ seizures, it is not a 
necessary condition.”31  Similarly, the “inevitable discovery doctrine” is an exception 
maintaining that “evidence obtained during the course of an unreasonable search and seizure 
should not be excluded ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained 
inevitably’ without the constitutional violation.”32 
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement addresses the warrantless search of 
an automobile that has been stopped by law enforcement officers who had probable cause to 
believe that the vehicle contained incriminating evidence.33  Often it may not be practicable to 
secure a warrant for the automobile if “the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or 
                                                                 
27
 Id.  See infra Part III.A (discussing case law finding cell phones to be containers), and Part IV.C.3 (suggesting the 
possibility that “electronic containers” could be an exception to the general container rule). 
28
 Id. at 461. 
29
 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). 
30
 Martin, 806 F.2d at 206–07. 
31
 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990). 
32
 United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984)). 
33
 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
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jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.”34  The general rule is that “if a car is readily 
mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth 
Amendment…permits police to search the vehicle without more.”35  The Supreme Court has 
extended this rule by stating that the warrantless search of an automobile could include a 
“probing search” of a container or package found inside the car when the search is supported by 
probable cause.36  Thus, “if probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it 
justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the 
search.”37 
B.  HOW ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY HAVE CHANGED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
 As new technology arises, it changes and enhances the world in which we live, so the law 
adapts accordingly.  The Supreme Court openly acknowledged that “it would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been 
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”38  Today, the advancements in cell phone 
technology provide law enforcement with a “virtual Rolodex of alleged criminal contacts – 
something that days of coercion, interrogation or even torture may not reveal.”39  Very quickly, 
these advanced cell phones are becoming less of a secure and private communication tool, rather, 
they are more of a “hangman’s noose.”40  But should advancements in technology force us to 
give up our core civil liberties and constitutional rights?  Not necessarily.  Although the Fourth 
Amendment has been interpreted to protect a citizen’s right of privacy, “the extent to which the 
Fourth Amendment provides protection for the contents of electronic communications (such as 
                                                                 
34
 Id. at 569 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1923)). 
35
 Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). 
36
 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982). 
37
 Id. at 825. 
38
 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) 
39
 David Mock, Wireless Advances the Criminal Enterprise, THE FEATURE ARCHIVES WEB (June 28, 2002), 
http://thefeaturearchives.com/topic/Technology/Wireless_Advances_the_Criminal_Enterprise.html. 
40
 Id. 
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images stored on a cell phone)…is an open question.”41  The way courts interpret the Fourth 
Amendment will ultimately give us guidance into how protected we are with respect to the 
information stored in cell phones. 
 
 
 
 
1.  APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO CELL PHONES 
 
 Today, cell phones are used for countless reasons by millions of people.42  Advances in 
cell phone technology have equipped users with portable personal computers, allowing people to 
store everything they need to live their daily lives on a handheld device.  The potential 
information stored on cell phones includes items such as “subscriber and equipment identifiers; 
phonebook information; appointment calendars; text messages; call logs for dialed, incoming, 
and missed calls; email; photographs; audio and video recordings; multimedia messages; instant 
messaging; Web browsing history; electronic documents; and user location information.”43 
No longer do cell phones merely place calls without a landline connection; cell phones 
have become very “smart.”  A “smartphone” is “a cellular telephone with an integrated computer 
and other features not originally associated with telephones, such as an operating system, Web 
browsing and the ability to run software applications” along with “texting, gaming, personal 
information management and cameras.”44  Smartphones provide advanced computing and have 
the capability to run mobile applications with more connectivity, processing, and storage options 
                                                                 
41
 Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440, 448 (W.D. Va. 2009). 
42
 “As of June 2010, there were approximately 292.8 million U.S. cell phone users.”  Ashley B. Snyder, Comment, 
The Fourth Amendment and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches: When is Your Cell Phone Protected? , 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 155, 162 (2011). 
43
 Id. at 162-63. 
44
 Smartphone, SEARCH MOBILE COMPUTING, http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/smartphone 
(last updated Aug. 2000). 
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than regular cell phones.45  A smartphone is “a social network and entertainment center all rolled 
into a solitary, convenient device.”46 
With the vast amount of information accessible from a cell phone, privacy issues would 
necessarily transpire.  It is obvious why law enforcement officers would want to search a cell 
phone’s content in the hopes they might find something incriminating to use later against the 
arrestee-cell phone owner.  Courts in turn must maintain the privacy every citizen expects in 
their handheld technology to the extent it is reasonable in each arrest situation.  “Smartphones 
make up a growing share of the United States mobile phones market, and are likely to be 
pervasive in the near future…The question of when and how they may be searched is therefore 
an important one.”47 
2.  DO PEOPLE HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THEIR CELL 
PHONES? 
 
Courts have come to varied conclusions as to whether the Katz test has been satisfied so 
as to provide a reasonable expectation of privacy to a cell phone user in their device.  48   The 
background case law on telephone landlines marks the beginning of this discussion.  In the 1979 
Supreme Court case Smith v. Maryland, police officers, without a warrant, installed a pen 
register in a telephone system to intercept calls coming into a robbery victim’s home in order to 
establish who and where the calls were coming from.49  Once the defendant was identified as the 
caller, the Court held that the defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the numbers 
that he dialed from his phone since those numbers were automatically turned over to a third 
                                                                 
45
 David W. Bennett, The Challenges Facing Computer Forensics Investigators in Obtaining Information from 
Mobile Devices for Use in Criminal Investigations, FORENSIC FOCUS: ARTICLES/PAPERS (Aug. 20, 2011), 
http://articles.forensicfocus.com/2011/08/22/the-challenges-facing-computer-forensics-investigators-in-obtaining-
information-from-mobile-devices-for-use-in-criminal-investigations/. 
46
 Id. 
47
 People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 514 (Cal. 2011) (Werdegar, J., dissenting).  
48
 See cases cited supra note 10 for a discussion of the Katz test. 
49
 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
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party, the phone company.50  The Court also stated that even if the defendant did have some 
subjective expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed, this was not an expectation that 
society was prepared to recognize as reasonable.51  Therefore, the Court ultimately held that the 
installation of the pen register to recover telephone numbers dialed by the defendant was not a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment, and no warrant was required. 
While Smith was decided before cell phones were in use, the same issue the Supreme 
Court addressed back in 1979 is called into question now: if a cell phone user has provided 
information to third parties like Verizon and AT&T, do they have an expectation of privacy in 
their call logs?  Courts today generally conclude that the content and information a person stores 
on his or her cell phone, like one’s call log, is entitled to some form of privacy.52  In order to 
obtain this information, most courts agree that a warrant is required, unless an exception to the 
warrant requirement applies.  Many courts have found that a person has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their cell phone when they claim to have a possessory interest, a right to control 
access, or show some sort of subjective expectation of privacy, for example, by taking 
precautionary measures to maintain the expected privacy like locking the phone or keeping it on 
his or her person.53 
                                                                 
50
 Id. at 742-44. 
51
 Id. at 743. 
52
 See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1082 (Conn. 2010) (individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
all of the contents of his cell phone, including his subscriber number); United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 
(5th Cir. 2008) (individual has reasonable expectation of privacy in information contained in cell phone because 
they contain a wealth of private information); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M .D. Fla. 
2008) (“An owner of a cell phone generally has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic data stored on 
the phone.”); United States v. Morales -Ortiz, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1139 (D.N.M. 2004) (There is “an expectation 
of privacy in an electronic repository for personal data, including cell telephones.”); United States v. James, No. 
1:06CR134, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34864, at *10 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008) (“It is reasonable for a person to expect the 
information contained in a cell phone—especially information such as that contained in the address book, which is 
not available even to the service provider—will be free from intrusion from both the government and the general 
public.”).  But see United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 (D. Kan. 2007) (Defendant did not 
assert ownership to the phones, nor did he present any evidence that they were his or insure his privacy in them, so 
the court found that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of the phones).  
53
 See State v. Sealy, 546 A.2d 271, 273 (Conn. 1988); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 1997). 
12 
 
 
III. THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY REGARDING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF CELL PHONES 
 
There is a split of authority, in both federal and state courts, regarding whether a warrant 
is required to search a cell phone or retrieve information on a cell phone pursuant to an arrest.  
The case law on this subject analyzes whether the search of the phone is legitimate and, for the 
purposes of this paper, provides a framework for analyzing the constitutionality of using 
extraction technology.   
A.  CASES THAT FIND SEARCHES OF A CELL PHONE WITHOUT A WARRANT REASONABLE 
 
Courts that find warrantless cell phone searches reasonable generally follow the search 
incident to arrest exception or the exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment.  Searches have 
been deemed necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence when incoming calls or text 
messages override previous ones, or have been justified as inventory searches.  Cell phones have 
also been compared to pagers, which most courts have found to be searchable without a warrant.  
Courts also maintain that the type of information stored on one’s cell phone is similar to that 
which is found in a wallet or address book, both of which have been found to be searchable 
incident to arrest.54 
1.  FEDERAL LAW PERMITTING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 
  
In 2009, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Murphy upheld a warrantless search of an 
arrestee’s cell phone under the search incident to arrest exception.55  In this case, after the 
officers had arrested the defendant for obstruction of justice for giving them false names, the 
officers searched the defendant’s phone to uncover possible incriminating evidence about the 
                                                                 
54
 United States v. Cote, No. 03CR271, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11725, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005) (“Searches of 
items such as wallets and address books, which [the court] consider[ed] analogous to [Defendant’s] cellular phone 
since they would contain similar information, have long been held valid when made incident to an arrest.”), aff'd, 
504 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2007). 
55
 United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2016 (2009).  
13 
 
defendant regarding drug activity and the existence of counterfeit money.56  The search of the 
phone occurred multiple times; once in the defendant’s presence and again at the police 
department.57  The searches ultimately uncovered text messages that were determined to be sent 
from the defendant’s drug dealer.58  The court found that the searches of the defendant’s phone 
were acceptable without a warrant because the first search was a search incident to defendant’s 
lawful arrest, and the second search was a valid inventory search which was also necessary to 
preserve evidence stored on the phone.59  The court determined that “officers may retrieve text 
messages and other information from cell phones and pagers seized incident to an arrest” for the 
purpose of preservation since call logs and text messages may be overwritten as new calls and 
text messages are received.60 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Finley, found that the law enforcement 
officer’s warrantless cell phone search of the defendant’s call log and text messages was proper 
as incident to a lawful arrest.61  The defendant in Finley was arrested on drug charges and, 
incident to his arrest, he was searched and his phone was seized.62  Although the officers 
transported the defendant to the accomplice’s home and later searched the cell phone outside the 
home, after the defendant had already been taken into custody, the search was still “substantially 
contemporaneous with his arrest.”63  The court justified the search as permissible by 
characterizing the phone as a container, and therefore, searchable upon the defendant’s lawful 
                                                                 
56
 Id. at 409. 
57
 Id. at 412. 
58
 Id. at 409. 
59
 Id. at 412. 
60
 Id.   
61
 United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007); accord United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 712 (5th 
Cir. 2011). 
62
 Finley, 477 F.3d at 253. 
63
 Id. at 260. 
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arrest.64  The court decided that “police officers are not constrained to search only for weapons 
or instruments of escape on the arrestee's person; they may also, without any additional 
justification, look for evidence of the arrestee's crime on his person in order to preserve it for use 
at trial.”65  In United States v. Curtis, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a denial of the defendant’s 
motion to suppress text messages taken on his phone pursuant to the Finley rule of authorizing 
police officers to search the electronic contents of an arrestee’s cell phone recovered from the 
area within said arrestee’s immediate control.66   
 The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Ortiz, also followed the search incident to arrest 
exception when addressing the issue of a warrantless search.67  While this case concerned a 
pager, a pager is very similar to a cell phone in that it stores personal information and data, and 
there is an identical necessity to preserve evidence in pagers as there is in cell phones as 
discussed in Murphy.68  In Ortiz, the court held that law enforcement officers may search or 
retrieve information from a pager in order to prevent its destruction as evidence.69  The court 
maintained that “an officer’s need to preserve evidence is an important law enforcement 
component of the rationale for permitting a search of a suspect incident to a valid arrest.”70  
Further, due to the “finite nature of a pager’s electronic memory, incoming pages may destroy 
currently stored telephone numbers in a pager’s memory.”71   
                                                                 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. 
66
 United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 711-14 (5th Cir. 2011). 
67
 United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Pineda-Areola, 372 F. App’x 
661, 662 (7th Cir. 2010); accord Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 F. App’x 216, 225 (10th Cir. 2009). 
68
 Murphy, 552 F.3d at 412.  See also United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2008) (per 
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The District Court of Minnesota followed Finley and Ortiz in deciding that if a cell phone 
is lawfully seized, officers may also search any data electronically stored in the device.”72  In this 
case, after arresting one of two defendants for drug distribution and conspiracy, the officers 
searched the “electronic memory” of his two cell phones for information linking both the two 
defendants and their criminal acts.”73  Further, the District Court of Arizona decided a case 
where a defendant was arrested for drug-trafficking and law enforcement agents searched the 
phone only minutes after the arrest and later seized the phone for the purpose of uncovering his 
call log.74  Based upon the fact that the agents were in a desperate need to find other suspects 
who were at large, as well as the good reason they had to believe that the other suspects were in 
contact with the defendant through his cell phone, the court found this search permissible as a 
search incident to an arrest.75  Additionally, the court noted that “there is authority for the 
proposition that cell phones…in drug-trafficking investigations may come within the plain view 
exception to the warrant requirement as items akin to contraband, in that they are often tools of 
the drug-trafficking trade.”76 
The District Court of Kansas rejected the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized 
from his cell phone pursuant to a warrantless search.77  The officers searched the cell phone after 
the defendant was arrested for various drug charges, and the court found that the search was 
properly within the scope of an inventory search pursuant to a search incident to arrest.78  A 
question remained, however, whether the officer in this case was acting unreasonably when 
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noting the numbers of incoming calls that the phone was receiving and storing in its memory.79  
The court concluded that “because a cell phone has a limited memory to store numbers” the 
officer acted reasonably when he recorded the numbers “in the event that subsequent incoming 
calls effected the deletion or overwriting of the earlier stored numbers.”80  Ultimately, as a matter 
of exigency, the court held that the officer had “the authority to immediately search or retrieve 
the cell phone’s memory of stored numbers of incoming calls in order to prevent the destruction 
of this evidence.”81 
2.  STATE LAW PERMITTING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 
  
 This year, in People v. Diaz, the Supreme Court of California determined that the search 
of the defendant’s cell phone text message folder, which occurred at the police station, was valid 
without a warrant.82  The defendant was arrested for being a coconspirator in the sale of drugs, 
and his cell phone was located on his person.83  The issue became whether it was unreasonable 
that the search of the cell phone was delayed until after the defendant was taken into custody.84  
If the court determined that the cell phone was “immediately associated with [his] person,” then 
the delayed warrantless search was valid incident to his lawful arrest, but if it was not, then the 
search was invalid as being too “remote in time and place from the arrest” unless an exigency 
applied.85  The court ultimately held the search to be valid because the cell phone “was an item 
[of personal property] on [defendant’s] person at the time of his arrest and during the 
administrative processing at the police station.”86  The court analogized the cell phone to an 
article of clothing found on a person, just as the phone was found on the defendant and in his 
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immediate control.87  Although the court found no exigent circumstances apparent to otherwise 
justify the warrantless search, the immediate association of the cell phone with the defendant 
after the arrest was enough to justify the police inspection at the station without a warrant.88 
 A Florida appellate court also upheld the warrantless search of a cell phone when a police 
officer searched the defendant’s cell phone pursuant to his arrest for sexual battery of a child.89  
When the officer first took possession of the phone from the defendant’s pocket, the defendant 
became very nervous, causing the officer to flip open the phone to ensure that it was not a 
disguised weapon.90  Upon opening the phone, the officer noticed that the wallpaper behind the 
phone’s main menu was a picture of a prepubescent female in a sexually compromised 
position.91  Based upon the nature of the defendant’s arrest, the officer decided to search the 
media files on the cell phone, further uncovering images of child pornography.92  The court 
followed Finley and concluded that the phone was a container and searchable under the search 
incident to arrest exception.93  It stated that “digital files and programs on cell phones have 
merely served as replacements for personal effects like address books, calendar books, photo 
albums, and file folders previously carried in a tangible form.”94  Further, when viewed in this 
light, the phone was merely a case, a closed container, containing these personal effects.95   
A Georgia appellate court upheld a warrantless cell phone search of the defendant’s 
phone following her arrest for unlawfully attempting to purchase a controlled substance.96  The 
officer had been using the alleged drug dealer’s cell phone to communicate with the defendant 
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and ultimately plan a meeting for her to make a buy.97  At the designated meeting spot, the 
officer observed the defendant in her car “entering data into her phone” and the officer “almost 
contemporaneously received another text message” announcing her arrival at the meeting 
place.98  The officer approached the defendant’s car, identified himself, and arrested her.99  With 
the defendant’s consent, and as a search incident to her arrest, the officer searched the 
defendant’s vehicle and uncovered her cell phone inside her purse.100  The officer searched the 
phone for the text messages regarding the drug sale and, to preserve the messages, the officer 
downloaded and printed them.101  The court determined that “when an officer is authorized to 
search in a vehicle for a specific object and…comes across a container that reasonably might 
contain the object of his search,” namely, the cell phone, “the officer is authorized to open the 
container and search within it for the object.”102  Accordingly, the court held that the cell phone 
was enough like a container to be treated like one “in the context of a search for electronic data,” 
and the officer, believing that he would find what he was seeking on the phone, was therefore 
within reason when he searched its contents.103 
B.  CASES THAT FIND SEARCHES OF A CELL PHONE WITHOUT A WARRANT UNREASONABLE 
  
Other federal and state courts have chosen to prohibit warrantless cell phone searches 
entirely.  These courts generally rely on the principle that no exigency or need for officer safety 
exists, or that a delay between the arrest and the search was unreasonable.  Further, these courts 
recognize that the immense amount of personal data stored on cell phones generates a greater 
expectation of privacy, and thus, justifies heightened protection under the Fourth Amendment.  
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1.  FEDERAL LAW PROHIBITING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 
 
 The District Court of Nebraska concluded that the warrantless search of defendant’s cell 
phone was unreasonable.104  The defendant was arrested in 2009 for distributing and conspiring 
to distribute crack cocaine in 2008.105  During a search pursuant to his arrest, a cell phone was 
obtained from the defendant and the officer scanned and saved the contact list on the phone.106  
The court concluded that this search was unjustified because the officer could not reasonably 
believe that searching the phone would uncover evidence of a crime that allegedly occurred a 
year earlier.107  Further, “the phone did not present a risk of harm to officers or appear to be 
contraband or destructible evidence.”108  The court determined that the search was an invalid 
search incident to arrest.109 
The District Court for the Northern District of California granted a motion to suppress the 
warrantless search of the defendants’ cell phones.110  The defendants in this case were arrested 
for conducting a drug operation inside a residence.111  At the time of their arrests, no officer 
searched or seized any of the defendants’ cell phones.112  Once at the station, the cell phones’ 
address books and memory were searched by the officers.113  The court held that the officers did 
not successfully point to any exception to the warrant requirement to justify the searches and that 
the searches were “purely investigatory.”114  Since the search of the phones occurred more than 
an hour and a half after the arrest, it went “far beyond the original rationales for searches incident 
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to arrest, which were to remove weapons to ensure the safety of officers and bystanders, and the 
need to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence.”115  The court also noted that since cell 
phones “have the capacity for storing immense amounts of private information,” they are similar 
to computers, in which arrestees have significant privacy interests, rather than address books or 
pagers found on one’s person, in which one’s privacy interest decreases.116   
The District Court of Hawaii granted a motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained 
from the defendant’s cell phone during a search that was not determined to be contemporaneous 
with the defendant’s arrest.117  In this case, the defendant was arrested for being involved with 
drug smuggling and two cell phones were taken from him upon arrest.118  At the station, while 
the defendant was being processed, an officer searched the phones under the belief that they 
might contain evidence of a crime.119  One of the phones was unlocked and the officer was able 
to observe the defendant’s recent calls, text messages, and address book.120  The court 
determined, however, that the time period between the arrest and the search “spanned 
somewhere between two hours and fifteen minutes to three hours and forty-five minutes,” and 
the arrest and search also took place miles apart from each other.121  The government did not 
provide any legitimate excuse for the delay, and therefore, judging from the time period and 
physical distance between the arrest and search, the court held that the search was not “at about 
the same time of the arrest” or “roughly contemporaneous” with the arrest.122 
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2.  STATE LAW PROHIBITING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 
 
 The Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Smith, was the first high court in the country to 
consider the topic of a warrantless cell phone search incident to arrest.123  In this case, the 
defendant was arrested for selling drugs and officers searched his cell phone for call records and 
phone numbers that could further prove the defendant’s job as a drug dealer.124  While the state 
wanted the court to characterize the cell phone as a closed container like in Finley, the court 
refused.125  Instead, the court reasoned, as the U.S. Supreme Court has, that “objects falling 
under the banner of ‘closed container’ have traditionally been physical objects capable of 
holding other physical objects,” which a cell phone is not.126  The court acknowledged that, 
while in the past, electronic devices such as pagers were found to be closed containers subject to 
search, these cases never considered the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of container “which 
implies that the container must actually have a physical object within it.”127  Due to the modern 
cell phone’s ability to store “a wealth of digitized information wholly unlike any physical object 
found within a closed container” it could not be considered “a closed container for the purpose of 
a Fourth Amendment analysis.”128  Additionally, the court also found that there was no evidence 
that the search of the phone’s content was necessary to ensure the officer’s safety or to prevent 
imminent destruction of the information.129  Thus, the court held that the cell phone search was 
unreasonable and intrusive and a warrant should have been secured. 
 
IV. MOBILE FORENSIC TECHNOLOGY USED IN THE EXTRACTION OF CELL PHONE INFORMATION  
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The constitutionality of warrantless cell phone searches has been considered for more 
than a decade.  Rick Mislan, an assistant professor of computer and information technology at 
Purdue University, stated that “cell phones are ubiquitous in today’s world and nearly all crimes 
have a digital component to them.”130  As the number of cell phone users, as well as the types of 
cell phones available with unlimited abilities, increases, it is reasonable to see why law 
enforcement desires the ability to flip through a person’s phone to uncover incriminating 
information.  Now, officers can not only flip through a phone, but they can also extract the 
content of the phone.131  Before extraction technology became available, law enforcement 
agencies were no doubt at a disadvantage to criminals.132  Tracking and extraction devices, with 
the help of mobile device forensics, are becoming increasingly available to assist law 
enforcement in obtaining information on cell phones.  However the extraction process can prove 
to be very difficult due to the “volatile nature of electronic evidence.”133 
Cell phone users are generally innocent as “most cell phone owners think simply 
removing a phone’s SIM card removes personal information, but the phone’s internal memory, 
even communication exchanged between the phone and its server, remain.”134  It is mobile 
forensic technology that makes all of the so called deleted information retrievable again.  
Everyday users “continue to pump ever more data into cell phones . . . those indispensable 
companions that have so much to say about us.”135  Yet mobile forensics continue to expand in 
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nature, and are ultimately able to “get a fingerprint of who [a] person really is” via the 
information taken off of their cell phone.136   
A.  WHAT IS MOBILE FORENSIC TECHNOLOGY?  
 
Mobile device forensics entails “recovering digital evidence from a mobile device under 
forensically sound conditions.”137  “Forensically sound” means using “a particular technology or 
methodology.”138  The need for mobile device forensics was created by “the use of mobile 
phones in online transactions such as stock trading, flight reservations and check-in; mobile 
banking; and communications regarding illegal activities that are being utilized by criminals.”139   
Mobile forensic software tools access a wide range of devices to handle “the most 
common investigative situations with modest skill level requirements” while keeping the device 
intact.140  Some situations are more difficult, such as recovering deleted information, and require 
specialized tools and expertise, and perhaps even the disassembling of the cell phone itself.141  
The most important characteristic of forensic tools is the “ability to maintain the integrity of the 
original data source being acquired and also that of the extracted data.”142 
The forensic investigator completing the data extraction has one priority, that is, to use 
the most acceptable methods of obtaining evidence so that the evidence will be admitted 
accordingly and in an acceptable manner at trial.143  The evidence will usually be admitted if the 
trial judge finds that the search was lawful and that “the chain of custody rules including 
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evidence collection, evidence preservation, analysis, and reporting” were adhered to.144  The 
International Organization on Computer Evidence has published general principles that are to be 
followed when recovering digital evidence for chain of custody:  
1. All of the general forensic and procedural principles should be adhered to when 
dealing with digital evidence. 
2. Upon seizing digital evidence, any actions taken should not modify the original 
evidence. 
3. When it is necessary for personnel to access the original digital evidence, the 
personnel should be appropriately trained for the purpose. 
4. All activities associated to the seizure, access, storage or transfer of digital 
evidence must be fully and properly documented, preserved and available for 
review. 
5. An individual is responsible for all actions taken with respect to digital 
evidence when digital evidence is in that individual’s possession. 
6. Any agency that is responsible for seizing, accessing, storing or transferring 
digital evidence is responsible for compliance with all six principles.145 
 
Because of the advancements in cell phones and smartphones, forensic investigation techniques 
used to recover information have become highly complex and numerous companies in the 
mobile forensic field boast the capability of obtaining the information law enforcement desires. 
B.  CELLEBRITE  
 
 Cellebrite has been used for over a decade, and “provides the widest coverage in the 
[mobile forensics] market.”146  Its technology continues to be the most popular of all the mobile 
forensic technologies.  The Cellebrite Universal Forensics Extraction Device (UFED) Forensic 
System is a device used in the field and the research lab.147  It supports “most cellular device 
interfaces…and can provide data extraction of content such as audio, video, phone call history 
and deleted text messages stored in mobile phones.”148  Cellebrite’s UFED System works with 
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Apple’s iPhone, as well as over 3,000 phones by “suck[ing] data out…without the need for an 
intermediary computer.”149  Cellebrite maintains that it is the “tool of choice for thousands of 
forensic specialists in police, special forces, tax fraud, customs, border control, and anti-terrorist 
investigations in more than 60 countries.”150  Cellebrite calls its technology easy to use because 
UFED gathers its retrieved data into reports for research and evidence which can later be 
admitted in court.151   
 Cellebrite’s tools are made to “dump the entirety of your phone…all of your text 
messages, emails, videos, and photos – even the ones you deleted – Google Map queries…web 
searches, passwords, call logs…your phone’s entire file system.”152  This information is “all 
timestamped, all geotagged, all providing a digital recreation of the way your physical existence 
projects itself into the cellular ether.”153  Cellebrite’s website maintains that “for law 
enforcement, leveraging this valuable resource of information with Cellebrite’s UFED System 
ensures that you get every bit of information necessary to more effectively reach your crime 
solving goals.”154   
 Besides Cellebrite, which claims to have sold 3,500 devices in the eleven months since its 
UFED System reached the market, other devices are commonly sold and used by law 
enforcement.155  Paraben Corporation, Micro Systemation, Susteen, Compelson Labs, Radio 
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Tactics, Final Data, Oxygen Software, and Katana Forensics, the makers of Lantern,156 are other 
companies which sell devices for cell phone extraction.   
C. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WARRANTLESS EXTRACTION OF CELL PHONE DATA  
 
There are many legitimate pros and cons for needing a warrant to search ones cell phone, 
and further, to extract the data from the phone itself.  As a threshold issue, it must be determined 
whether extracted data from one’s phone, by the use of mobile forensic technology such as 
Cellebrite, is a search or seizure that would be subject to the Fourth Amendment requirements.  
A search occurs when “an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable 
is infringed.”157  The seizure of property occurs when “there is some meaningful interference 
with an individual’s possessory interest in that property.”158  This determination should be 
considered in light of where the extraction takes place.  Additionally, whether a cell phone can 
be characterized as a container will further determine the constitutionality of using mobile 
forensic technology to extract data from cell phones. 
1.  IF THE EXTRACTION TECHNOLOGY IS BEING USED IN A LAB SETTING  
 
 If a law enforcement officer has arrested a suspect and desires to search their phone, it 
may be necessary to take the phone to a lab so that the extraction could be conducted in 
forensically sound conditions.  In this case, it would seem obvious that the phone has been seized 
in order to take it to an off-site location to extract the data.  The Fourth Amendment is thus 
implicated, and unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies, a warrant would be 
necessary to search and extract the phone. 
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 If the phone is taken to a lab, there is significant time between when the phone is taken 
and when it is connected to a program that will extract its information.  Therefore, in the context 
of a warrantless search and seizure, law enforcement cannot rely on the fact that emergency 
discounts the need for a warrant, or that any exigency exception could apply.  Regardless of how 
long it takes for an officer to reach a lab from the scene of an arrest, it is reasonable to assume 
that the officer could obtain a warrant in the proper way, either in person or electronically.  
Additionally, an officer cannot claim that there is a risk that evidence will be destroyed, 
concealed, or overridden.  Mobile forensic technology prides itself on the ability to obtain 
information that has been deleted or hidden on a phone.  As in Murphy, preservation of evidence 
is no longer necessary as companies like Cellebrite can “dump the entirety” of a person’s phone, 
deleted information and all.159   
The Supreme Court has held that when an officer makes an arrest, it is reasonable to 
search the person arrested in order to “remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use 
in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.”160  The Court said that “otherwise, the officer's 
safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.”161  First and foremost, a cell 
phone is not a gun.  It is not dangerous, and it can pose minimal, if any, immediate threat to an 
arresting officer.  By arresting a suspect and removing a cell phone, especially if the phone is 
removed for the purposes of taking it to an off-site lab for extraction, an officer cannot be 
considered to be in any danger, nor can the cell phone be used in any way to effect an escape by, 
perhaps, a suspect calling a co-conspirator for assistance. 
There are no exceptions to the warrant requirement that would deter an officer from 
obtaining a warrant to extract information from a cell phone when the phone is being taken to a 
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lab.  Due to the time lapse between the arrest itself and the later extraction, a law enforcement 
officer has no excuse not to call a magistrate and obtain a warrant in order to avoid any potential 
Fourth Amendment violation. 
2.  IF THE EXTRACTION TECHNOLOGY IS BEING USED AT THE SITE OF ARREST   
   
Companies such as Cellebrite maintain that their devices may be used in the field as well 
as a research lab.162  Therefore, if law enforcement officers have mobile forensic technology 
equipment with them at the scene of an arrest, and have the required training necessary to 
effectuate a valid extraction, a warrant may not be required in such an instance to search the 
phone and further, seize the content of it. 
 Most courts which hold that searches of a cell phone without a warrant are reasonable 
follow the search incident to an arrest exception to the warrant requirement.  The Finley court 
found the search substantially contemporaneous with the defendant’s arrest.163  Similarly, the 
Diaz court found that the “immediate association” of the cell phone with the defendant after his 
arrest entitled the police to inspect the phone’s contents without a warrant.164  If there is 
sufficient evidence that trained officers have conducted an on-site extraction of a valid arrestee’s 
phone as a search incident to arrest, then no warrant would be necessary.  Determining if the on-
site extraction is sufficient without a warrant is a fact-based inquiry that must consider all of the 
possible warrant exceptions to the Fourth Amendment.  At the scene of an arrest, it is likely that 
a warrant may not be necessary due to exigent circumstances such as safeguarding the police or 
the public from an ongoing crime, or protecting against the loss of evidence on the cell phone.   
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Another consideration for an on-site extraction is whether the cell phone is a container.  
Some courts have held that a cell phone does qualify as a closed container,165 while other courts 
have held that a cell phone cannot be considered a container because it is not “capable of holding 
other physical objects.”166  Therefore, only if a cell phone is found to be a container pursuant to a 
valid inventory search, will a warrant not be required to search and extract information from the 
phone.  If, on the other hand, a cell phone is not a container, then a warrant must be required to 
search and extract anything from it.  The future of Fourth Amendment protections for cell phones 
depends on their being designated as “electronic containers,” and thus, not searchable without a 
warrant.  
3.  IS THERE SUCH THING AS AN ELECTRONIC CONTAINER?   
 
 The question of whether a cell phone can be characterized as a container, and thus 
searchable, has yet to be unanimously determined.  The Supreme Court defined “containe r” in 
1981, prior to the widespread use of cell phones, and did not specifically address “the authority 
to search a device’s electronic memory.”167  Perhaps a new type of container—an “electronic 
container”—should be defined by all courts in the future to help resolve this issue.   
A cell phone is able to store an enormous amount of digital information “inside” itself.  
With constant advances in cell phone technology, it may be time for the law to limit its definition 
of a container to exclude the digital content on cell phones, classifying “electronic containers” as 
an exception to the ordinary container exception.  If courts adopt this definition of electronic 
containers, then law enforcement would be required to obtain a warrant before searching and 
extracting the data contained on the phones.  Although cell phones are, by definition, containers, 
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albeit of digital content, the unique nature of this content justifies a new rule which excludes 
searching electronic containers as a valid inventory search incident to arrest.  Due to the 
incredible amount of personal information that can be stored on a phone, such as medical and 
financial records, users have “a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of privacy 
in the information they contain.”168 
A cell phone qualifies as a container.  While a digital piece of information is “wholly 
unlike any physical object found within a closed container,” the information found within the 
cell phone is most likely the equivalent to the printed physical copy of the digital information.169  
Before cell phones were invented, the information now kept on phones would have necessarily 
been in physical form and carried in containers.170  The capabilities of cell phones today, with 
respect to the amount and type of digital content stored on the phones, serve as a substitute for 
most of what people used to carry around as tangible objects and effects.171  No longer is it 
necessary to carry address books, calendars, photo albums, or file folders; all of these can be 
contained in one small cell phone.172  When “viewed in this light, the cell phone merely acts as a 
case (i.e. closed container)” holding one’s personal effects.173  Thus, since everything stored on a 
cell phone would be searchable if it were in its physical form, it seems logical that a cell phone 
should always be characterized as a container for purposes of a search.   
Nevertheless, a cell phone contains electronic information that is categorically different 
from the physical information found inside ordinary containers.  Although some cell phone 
content would have been found in a searchable physical form in the past, much of the 
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information stored on phones today would not have been.  For example, with advancements in 
electronic medical records, it is possible for someone to carry on their cell phone their entire 
medical history which, in tangible form, could fill boxes.  Similarly, cell phones can store vast 
amounts of financial records that could presumably fill a filing cabinet.  Cell phones can hold 
entire libraries full of books, or record stores full of music.  The argument that a cell phone 
“merely acts as a case” or is a substitute for physically carrying one’s effects is preposterous.174 
 While some courts have considered the term “electronic container” in the context of cell 
phone searches, they have explained that they fit within the ordinary container exception.175  But 
modern cell phone capabilities justify that electronic containers be excluded from the ordinary 
definition, rather than become a subset of the container exception.  If this were the case, warrants 
would be required, and citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phones would be 
acknowledged and afforded constitutional protections. 
D. PRIVACY ADVOCATES VS.  LAW ENFORCEMENT   
 
 The technology created in order to extract information from cell phones is at the heart of 
contention between privacy advocates and law enforcement agencies.  This year in Michigan, the 
American Civil Liberties Union received information that Michigan State Police were using 
Cellebrite UFED to extract information from cell phones during routine traffic stops.176  In an 
interview, Mark P. Fancher, an ACLU Attorney for the Racial Justice Project, stated that “there 
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is great potential for abuse here, in that a police officer or a State trooper who may not be 
monitored or supervised on the street.”177   
The ACLU wrote a letter to the State Police requesting information regarding what 
mobile forensic devices were being used, how many were being used, how often, and why.178  
The letter also reiterated that using cell phone extraction devices, without the knowledge of the 
cell phone user, violates the Fourth Amendment.179  The Michigan State Police, however, 
responded to the ACLU’s request for information on their use of extraction devices by stating 
that “the State Police will provide information in accordance with the Freedom of Information 
Act…there may be a processing fee to search for, retrieve, review, examine, and separate exempt 
material” which has been estimated as costing those who request such information from the 
police at about $500,000.  Fancher replies, “This should be something that they should be 
handing over freely.  They should be more than happy to share with the public the routines and 
the guidelines that they follow.”180 
Michigan’s response to the ACLU’s letter should have a disturbing effect on every 
citizen and privacy advocate around the nation.  If one state is allowing its law enforcement to 
use extraction devices without a warrant, it is likely that more states will follow in its lead unless 
laws are passed controlling this action.  Otherwise, in a sense, our phones are becoming “our 
outboard brains,” putting us in a “very difficult privacy position.”181 
Similarly, ever since the California Supreme Court’s decision in Diaz, California civil 
rights advocates are coming forth in protest.  For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
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(EFF), a non-profit digital rights advocacy group, supports a California bill which would require 
state police officers to secure a warrant before searching an arrestee’s cell phone.182  In Oregon, 
the EFF filed an amicus brief on behalf of a criminal suspect who, forty minutes after being 
arrested and placed in a holding cell, had his cell phone “fished through” by an investigator, 
without a warrant, in order to uncover evidence related to his alleged crime.183  Oregon officials 
maintained that the warrantless search was excused as being a search incident to arrest.184  
However, EFF senior staff attorney Marcia Hofmann maintained that “this is an empty excuse 
from the police—the suspect was in custody and unable to destroy evidence on his cell 
phone.”185 
Privacy advocates encourage cell phone users to set up passwords on their phones so that 
the phone’s information and functions are less accessible to law enforcement.  Catherine Crump 
of the ACLU stated that “the police can ask you to unlock the phone—which many people will 
do—but they almost certainly cannot compel you to unlock your phone without the involvement 
of a judge.”186  According to a 2009 study, 60% of people protect their phone with a password.187  
But, there are published guides available online that provide instructions on how to bypass 
passwords placed on cell phones.188  Furthermore, mobile forensic technology can bypass 
passwords as well.  While password-protecting one’s phone makes it considerably harder for 
officers to search the phone, it does not make it impossible.  Therefore, while password 
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protecting cell phones is merely one step in securing privacy rights, these passwords do not 
guarantee privacy. 
 
V. THE SCOPE OF SEARCHES, EXTRACTIONS, AND CLOUD COMPUTING:  
WHERE SHOULD COURTS DRAW A LINE? 
 
A.  CELL PHONES AND COMPUTERS  
 
 Often, searches of cell phones have been likened to searches of computers.  Like 
warrantless cell phone searches, courts have come to varying conclusions on the constitutionality 
of a warrantless computer search.  In United States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit held that 
police surveillance of a defendant’s computer through a pen register analogue located at the 
Internet provider’s facility was reasonable.189  The two defendants in this case were arrested for 
various drug offenses and during the investigation, police officers set up surveillance of one of 
the defendants’ computer to obtain e-mail addresses of outgoing e-mails, addresses of websites 
visited, and the total volume of information transmitted to and from his account.190  The court 
concluded that the surveillance of the computer was analogous to the use of the pen register in 
Smith v. Maryland which the Supreme Court held to be constitutional and not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment since the information the pen register intercepted was being sent to a third 
party, the telephone company.191  In its analysis, this court held that e-mail and Internet users, 
like the telephone users in Smith, relied on third-party equipment in order to communicate, thus 
their expectation of privacy in their e-mail or IP addresses of the websites they visited 
diminished.192  Additionally, the court justified the computer surveillance on the grounds that the 
information obtained did not reveal the underlying content of the communication, but merely the 
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e-mail addresses and IP addresses, just like the pen register in Smith only revealed telephone 
numbers.193  The officers neither obtained the specific information from the body of the emails, 
nor the particular websites to which the IP addresses led.194  
 In United States v. Arnold, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a warrantless search of a 
defendant’s laptop computer, separate hard drive, computer memory stick, and six compact discs 
was lawful based upon the “border-search doctrine.”195  While the defendant was waiting in line 
for customs upon returning to the United States from the Philippines, a U.S. Customs and Border 
Patrol Officer selected him for secondary questioning whereupon his luggage was searched and 
the laptop and its accessories were found.196  After searching the computer and equipment, 
officers came across numerous images depicting child pornography which led to various charges 
against the defendant.197  The district court held that, due to the nature of the private, personal 
and valuable information stored on one’s computer, the search was invalid without a warrant or 
reasonable suspicion.198  The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed and held that the warrantless 
search of the defendant’s computer and equipment was valid under the border-search doctrine, 
and thus, no reasonable suspicion was required.199  Under the border-search doctrine, searches of 
closed containers and their contents can occur at United States’ borders “without particularized 
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.”200  The justification for a border search is that the 
United States has the authority “to search the baggage of arriving international travelers” based 
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upon “its inherent sovereign authority to protect its territorial integrity.”201  Thus, “by reason of 
that authority, [the United States] is entitled to require that whoever seeks entry must establish 
the right to enter and to bring into the country whatever he may carry.”202 
 By contrast, in United States v. James, the Eighth Circuit suppressed information 
discovered on computer discs given to police by a third party.203  The defendant in this case was 
arrested for sexual misconduct involving a child and, while in jail, wrote a letter to a third party 
instructing him to destroy certain computer discs.204  Detectives intercepted the letter and went to 
the third party’s home, without a warrant, where they obtained the discs and then viewed the 
content of the discs at the police station.205  The discs contained images of child pornography.206  
The court ultimately held that the detectives’ actions violated the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement because not only did the third party lack authority to consent to the search, as he had 
no established common authority in owning the discs, but also no valid exception to the warrant 
requirement applied to justify the detectives’ behavior.207   
 In the Washington court of appeals, a defendant was arrested on suspicion of auto 
theft.208  While searching the defendant’s car, a laptop computer was found inside of a bag.209  
Suspecting that the laptop was stolen, the officer brought the computer to the police station 
where another officer searched the computer files for information about its lawful owner.210  
Based upon the information found in the computer, the officers were able to contact the 
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computer’s rightful owner and establish that the computer was stolen by the defendant.211  
Although the court found that the police had probable cause to both arrest the defendant and 
seize the computer from the bag in the car, it concluded that the subsequent search of the 
computer’s files was unlawful without a warrant.212  The court explained that “probable cause to 
believe property is stolen does not itself justify an investigative search of that property.”213  
Instead, “compliance with the warrant requirement is necessary to ensure that the police are 
justified in invading a person’s privacy interest to search for evidence.”214 
 As the varying case law demonstrates, it might seem obvious that with the cell phone 
technology available today, “the line between cell phones and computers has become 
increasingly blurry.”215  As there is still no unanimous precedent guiding all courts to address 
cell phone or computer searches the same way, our Fourth Amendment privacy rights remain in 
question.  Consequently, our rights regarding cloud computing—a quickly growing phenomenon 
that impacts both cell phones and computers—will likely be affected by this uncertainty. 
B.  CLOUD COMPUTING AND GROWING PRIVACY CONCERNS 
 
Cloud computing is the act of storing and accessing applications and computer data 
through the Internet, or a web browser, rather than running installed software on one’s personal 
computer, such as Microsoft Word or Excel.216  In essence, “every piece of data you need for 
every aspect of your life” is made available “at your fingertips and ready for use” by cloud 
computing.217  It allows you to “sync up your devices” and access all of your content on 
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“whatever device [you] have, wherever [you] happen to be.”218  Cloud computing also gives 
users the ability to share all data, photos, contacts, documents, music, and more with others in an 
instant, as well as gain access to the “public cloud and other personal clouds.”219 
Any device with Internet access can take advantage of the cloud.  Smartphones can easily 
synchronize with e-mail, social media, word-processing, or music programs that can then be 
accessed from any location and shared with whomever the user chooses.  Additionally, 
smartphones can synchronize with computers to give users the option to access their computer 
through their phone.  But what does this mean for our privacy rights?  We do not know and 
neither does the current law. 
Synchronizing computers with cell phones exposes the cell phone user to myriad privacy 
issues.  One of the major aspects of cloud computing is that third-party service providers store 
information in the cloud for one’s personal access.  The rule from Smith v. Maryland, that a 
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information turned over to third parties, 
seems to be applicable in the consideration of cloud computing.220  When one creates a personal 
cloud, accessing the cloud from a smartphone must come through a third party, whether it is 
Google, Facebook, Twitter, Outlook, and so forth.  Therefore, since everything on a computer 
can be placed on the cloud, and further accessed through a smartphone, then under Smith, there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in any of this information.  Consequently, law enforcement 
can search and extract all of this information without a warrant.  What a scary thought.  Although 
applying the Smith rule in this context is logical, citizens still anticipate having an expectation of 
privacy in their smartphones, even if they are accessing a cloud.  It is unreasonable to accept that 
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simply using the cloud would permit the government to search and extract all of the content from 
our phones.  In an effort to protect citizens’ constitutional rights, while still maintaining a strong 
criminal justice system, the scope of what the government can search and extract from cell 
phones must be limited. 
C.  WHERE SHOULD COURTS DRAW THE LINE? 
 
 As the law stands today, the government has numerous ways of accessing the content 
stored on one’s cell phone and computer, either through a warrantless search permitted under the 
Fourth Amendment or by accessing the cloud.  The scope of this access, however, must be 
controlled.  A line must be drawn somewhere, but as the law continuously struggles to keep up 
with emerging cell phone technology, it is unclear where this line will be.   
 Recently in United States v. Maynard, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit considered, among other claims, the scope of a warrantless search that took place by 
placing a GPS monitoring device on a co-defendant’s car in order to further a drug 
investigation.221  In this case, the police installed the GPS device on the co-defendant’s car 
without a warrant and monitored his movements twenty-four hours a day for four weeks.222  
While this case concerned a warrantless search of a GPS device rather than a cell phone, the co-
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy was still at issue.  The court expressed concern 
with the expanding application of the Fourth Amendment exceptions, and it determined that the 
monitoring of the car constituted a search and violated the co-defendant’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy.223  A novel question emerged: to what extent does “comprehensive” and “sustained” 
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surveillance trigger Fourth Amendment protections?224  The police were able to discover “the 
totality and pattern of [the co-defendant’s] movements from place to place,” not merely 
“movements from one place to another.”225  While the government maintained that the search 
was valid because the co-defendant’s actions were exposed to the public, so he could have been 
followed everywhere he went on public roads, the court held that “the whole of a person’s 
movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the 
likelihood a stranger would observe all those movements is not just remote, it is essentially 
nil.”226  The court further held that the information discovered by the police using the GPS was 
not “constructively exposed to the public.”227  The court likened the GPS surveillance to a rap 
sheet and explained that the prolonged surveillance “reveal[ed] types of information not revealed 
by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what 
he does ensemble.”228  In conclusion, the court held that the GPS monitoring “defeat[ed] an 
expectation of privacy that our society recognizes as reasonable.”229 
 In many ways, the GPS surveillance in Maynard can be analogized to searches of cell 
phones and access to personal clouds.  Like the twenty-four hour tracking of the co-defendant, 
searching and extracting content from one’s cell phone gives police officers a detailed picture of 
the cell phone user’s life.  An issue the D.C. Circuit faced was that the surveillance was sustained 
for a long period of time.  It was neither a one day occurrence nor a specific search that ended 
quickly.  Obtaining some data, text messages, contacts, or pictures from a cell phone is 
equivalent to a short surveillance that could potentially be valid if the search is limited in scope 
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and has a reasonable end point.  But if law enforcement is able to get all information from a cell 
phone or through a cloud, therefore reaching a computer, this search is the equivalent of the 
unconstitutional twenty-four hour a day, four week surveillance in Maynard.  Such a 
comprehensive search would uncover vast amounts of private information.  It is exactly this type 
of information gathering that the Maynard court held unconstitutional as a violation of society’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in such content.  Further, like the GPS information, the 
information contained on a cell phone is not “constructively exposed to the public,” even if it can 
be shared via cloud computing.  The content shared on a cloud can be selectively chosen, and if 
one so chooses, the cloud can remain “personal” and therefore, private. 
Just as privacy advocates are paving the way for courts to address extraction technology, 
The Digital Fourth Amendment Campaign has been created to lobby the government to create 
search and seizure laws that are up-to-date with today’s digital world.  The coalition “is 
dedicated to bringing obsolete laws…into the digital age.”230  Specifically, the campaign is 
asking Congress to “amend outdated U.S. laws originally intended to protect citizens against 
unwarranted governmental access to their private information held electronically by third 
parties.”231  The campaign maintains that “the laws protecting such information have been 
eroded by technological change.”232  It recognizes the current gaps in legal protection that 
American citizens face and asserts that “Congress can restore Americans’ individual liberties in 
the digital age and ensure the Internet remains a powerful engine of economic growth, while 
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preserving the tools needed by law enforcement investigations and removing legal uncertainty 
that may hamper law enforcement’s effectiveness.”233 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
The Fourth Amendment’s application, and criminal procedure in general, is being 
challenged by the growth of a technologically sophisticated, cell phone-using society.  As cell 
phones advance, the law too must advance.  It is no surprise that this is a difficult task facing all 
courts today since, “given their unique nature as multifunctional tools, cell phones defy easy 
categorization.”234 
Law enforcement agencies recognize that they are struggling to keep up with quickly 
changing mobile technology.  In response, “this is forcing them to make new and perhaps strange 
ethical choices.”235  The ability of law enforcement to search cell phones will no doubt be an 
advantage for the government in prosecuting cases, but courts will encounter challenging Fourth 
Amendment questions relating to these searches, especially when they result in extraction 
through mobile forensic technology.  As courts are faced with evidence from extraction devices, 
case law will emerge, and complicated Fourth Amendment analyses will be undertaken 
regarding the admissibility of the extracted data.  
Until clear precedent is established, warrantless cell phone searches and extractions will 
continue to be an issue.  But, if courts choose to limit container searches to exclude cell phones, 
designating them as “electronic containers,” law enforcement would always be required to obtain 
warrants before searching and extracting the data contained on phones.  If warrants become 
required to search and extract electronic containers, mobile forensic devices will relieve any fear 
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that the information on the phones will be lost or overridden due to the time delay in securing a 
warrant, since these devices are able to retrieve any deleted information from the phones. 
Cell phones today are capable of telling its user’s entire life story.  With cloud 
computing, and the option of synchronizing computers with cell phones, one becomes exposed to 
countless privacy issues.  In particular, whether Smith’s third party rule will continue to apply in 
such a situation, thereby making everything on one’s personal cloud void of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and thus, searchable.  Due to the incredible amount of personal 
information capable of being found on cell phones, it is reasonable for citizens to expect a high 
level of privacy in this information.  As evidenced by groups such as the ACLU, EFF, and The 
Digital Fourth Amendment Campaign, our Fourth Amendment rights are in jeopardy.  It is not 
only daunting, but unacceptable, if our laws are not updated accordingly so as to fairly address 
the concerns of citizens, law enforcement, and privacy advocates alike. 
In today’s society, cell phones and other forms of technology are the most highly 
recognized forms of communication.  These devices are ubiquitous in everyday life.  We depend 
on cell phones to keep our lives in order, to communicate, to assist, and to memorialize.  It is 
only fitting that citizens’ expectations of privacy in their cell phones be recognized and afforded 
the full weight of Fourth Amendment protections. 
